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In a recent article   in Anthropology News, Víctor Giménez Aliaga suggests that the contemporary wave
of  populism calls  for  closer  anthropological  analysis  of  the  term and  its  usages.  While  it  is  less
interesting  to  me to partake in  the eternal  strive to  define “what  populism means,”  I  concur  with
Giménez Aliaga with the need for anthropology to asses “practices—that is, the ways and purposes
with which the term is used in the political arena. In response to Gimenéz Aliaga’s call, I will try to
sketch out some of the insights an anthropological perspective could provide around current political
transformations.
The stigmatized categories of immigrants, or intraclass competitors are often categorized as just
a result of the malfunctioning of the state, or—worse—of its malicious will.
The problem with the left
A common feature stands out if we look at the global political situation: the left su ers an historicalff
identity crisis. Where the left fails in representing instances from the lower segments of the social ladder,
the populist right moves on to occupy the ideological terrain evacuated by its adversaries (Zizek 2000).
Left-wing parties, on the other hand, seem to have become the major political/institutional infrastructure
of “the middle classes.” But the middle classes also operate as an ideological horizon of aspirations and
values, something that is not defined by the opposition of its interests to those of other social groups
(Zizek 2009). In this sense, it  ends up working as  a  representational device enhancing the idea of a
socially uniform and conflict-free society (Guilluy 2010; Palomera, personal exchange 2017), repressing
class distinctions and the conflicts that these generate. Nevertheless, if the left has appeared for a while
successful in championing this vision, it has now become evident that the negation or repression of class
cleavages and class conflicts in the political sphere was a losing strategy in the long run. The middle
class’s  anxiety  about  losing  status  and  resources  has  backfired  against  the  left,  which  appears
increasingly bewildered, self-referential, and unable to govern current social and economic turmoil.
Moreover,  the  negation  or  repression of  the  political  representation  of  di erent  orders  of  interestsff
organized by the class paradigm, has led to moral re-articulation of social/political divides and morally
informed dichotomies such as deserving vs. undeserving, “la casta” vs. “the indignant”, the 1 percent
vs. the 99 percent (Zizek 2008, Kalb 2011, MouQe 2005, Crouch 2000).
Politics embodied
There seems to be a trend towards the personalization of politics. From Italy (Renzi,  Grillo,  Salvini, all
showing populist features) to the United States (Trump, Clinton), and in the burgeoning anti-EU scene
(from right to left, Le Pen, Farage, Salvini, Iglesias, Tsipras, or Varufakis vs. the Troika), charismatic
leaders have emerged in popular representations, cast as the heroes and anti-heroes who are supposed to
personify  the  struggle  of  diverse  social  projects  competing  over  the  control  of  society.  This  trend
naturalizes  processes  of  political  dispossession  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  struggles  to  resist  those
processes on the other. It also obscures the structural dynamics from which the same leaders seem both a
product and a metaphor.  The resulting double trend of scapegoating is directed against elites or the
abstracted state upward and against immigrants and intraclass competitors downward. This combined
logics  of  intraclass  di erentiation  and  embodiment,  appear  to  merge  into  an  almost  Dumontianff
comeback to a hierarchical vision of society, where egalitarian assumptions are implicitly denied and
di erence is essentialized.ff
Social chaos and the demagogue
The lack of representation or political recognition of lower classes, together with what one might call the
collapse of the middle class dream, seem to entail a pervasive di usion of fears touching upon the lossff
of power, status, wealth, or social  recognition. In addition, a socially transversal discontent with the
functioning of the state seems to have brought the latter to change its position within the cosmological
representation of contemporary Western societies. The parliamentary systems are increasingly less the
place  where  conflicts  among di erent  segments  of  society  are  negotiated  and are  on  their  way toff
becoming one among many subjects of political antagonism: just another political adversary to oppose.
In fact, the stigmatized categories of immigrants, or intraclass competitors are often categorized as just a
result of the malfunctioning of the state, or—worse—of its malicious will. Overall, these aspects seem
to announce a general collapse of established sociological and politological categories. Consequently,
social principles lose their capability to operate as axioms for social behavior. This is above all true in
current  political  life,  where  long  established  moral  and political  predicaments  no  longer  appear  to
govern projects of electoral and political solidarity. Voters of Syriza in Greece announced last year that
they would vote Golden Dawn (“if this doesn’t work out”), and Trump supporters have declared they
would have voted for Sanders.
This chaotic space is exploited by demagogues. They systematically foster and organize the political
fallout of economic, social, and psychological distress at the same time that they deliberately obstruct
the machinery of political conciliation. It is by inhabiting this space of contradiction that new political
agent  provocateurs  manage  to  arouse  gross  quantities  of  a ect,  often  raising  upside  down,ff
carnivalesque, erotic imageries (think of Berlusconi, Fortuyn, Kirchner, Trump). They release, in this
way, the necessary social  energy for breaking bonds and ties  of  long-established social  or political
solidarities. It is this “totalitarian” pressure imposed by the faltering of actual systems, which brings
together  diverse  segments  of  society  in  revolt  against  the  institutional  order  that  we  tend  to  term
“populism.”
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